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Abstract— The emergence of the partnership system in Early 
Renaissance Florence is often noted as a pivotal moment in the 
formation of capitalism. However, this social invention was not 
developed as a completely redefined system, but was the gradual 
process of adapting guild partnerships to domestic and 
international business. The purpose for this paper is to describe a 
simplistic agent-based model, where individuals form partnerships 
based on paradigms common in the medieval Florentine economy, 
as well as the results of the simulations. The final result is the 
emergence of entirely different partnership network structures, 
consistent with the structures seen in the early 15th century, as well 
as a rise in individual capital which led to the success of this 
system replicating itself across the European landscape. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Florentine economy of the early 14th century, while 
diverse and dynamic by European standards, did not 
operate significantly differently from other places in Europe 
at that time. However, by the beginning of the 15th century, 
and decidedly by 1434, the new economic model of 
patronage, business alliances and international partnerships 
not only formed the backbone of the Florentine economy, 
but was being exported throughout the Italian peninsula and 
across Western Europe. 
It is tempting to imagine these “new men of business” as 
revolutionaries, determined to redefine the way of doing 
commerce and international trade. However, this is often at 
odds with the relatively conservative mindset of the bankers 
who established this system. If anything, they were counter-
revolutionaries, determined to bring order and hierarchy 
back to Florence after the proto-Marxist Ciompi Revolt of 
1378. How, then, can we consolidate these two competing 
views? 
 A hypothesis put forth by Padgett and McLean [1]  is that 
the partnership system, what Melis (1962) called the sistema 
di aziende, was constructed not out of whole cloth, but by 
adopting a formerly existing system of apprenticeship that 
already operated in the guilds for the purposes of business 
partnerships. Padgett and Powell [2] define the emergence of 
new organizational processes in much the same way as 
biological evolution, as the adaptation and proliferation of 
one pattern in a different context, and the improvement of 
that process incrementally over time. 
In the context of the emergence of partnership systems, 
Padgett [2] in Chapter 6 defines this particular economic 
invention as “a set of legally autonomous companies linked 
through one person or through a small set of controlling 
partners.” He argues not only that this partnership system 
emerged from domestic bankers adopting the partnership 
paradigm of the guilds, but that the impetus for this 
invention came in the aftermath of the Ciompi Revolt of 
1378. In this turbulent aftermath, lawmakers sought to stifle 
the negotiating power of the tradesmen and so, unwittingly, 
encouraged them to form partnerships with the relatively 
few domestic bankers, thus propelling these men into 
international commerce. 
A. The Ciompi Revolt and the Aftermath 
In 1378, a revolt of the ciompi, known collectively as the 
popolo minuto, or “little people”, succeeded in kicking the 
wealthy patricians (known as the popolani and the magnates) 
out of Florence for a time, in the only successful worker’s 
revolt in pre-industrial European history. As this forced 
much of the wealth out of the city, export-oriented 
commerce ceased. This prompted the minor guilds and the 
liberal popolani to retake power in September 1378. This 
regime, in turn, was crushed by the major guild leaders and 
the domestic bankers in 1382. 
The revolt sparked waves of political reactions, each one 
more elitist than the last. Each regime added layers of 
oversight onto guild leadership. The 1382-1393 regime, 
paradoxically, aimed to limit the very autonomy which 
granted its power by forcing approval, and eventually the 
selection, of guild consuls to an external body, the 
Mercanzia. Eventually, the oversight of guild leadership and 
practices had the incidental effect of encouraging guildsmen 
and tradesmen to produce partnerships not within the guild, 
but outside of it, in order to garner more capital, both 
political and monetary. The domestic bankers, for their part, 
sought to seize upon this lucrative opportunity by adopting 
the partnership paradigms the guilds already had in place, 
the master-apprentice system. 
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This practice proved to be lucrative for both parties, and 
caused the economy of Florence to flourish, most notably for 
the banking families. While the specific actors changed over 
time, the success of the partnership system – ownership of 
various businesses and companies – was already well 
established by 1434, when Cosimo de Medici returned to 
Florence to end up becoming the de facto ruler, with power 
which relied heavily on his business partners.  
B. Emergence and Analysis 
The goal of this paper is to model and simulate the 
emergence of the partnership system, through the 
implementation of a revolt in the simulated environment. 
This model will simulate agents, representing individuals, 
making partnership decisions. At a point in simulated time, a 
revolt will occur in the model (replicating the Ciompi Revolt 
and the aftermath), which will prompt the agents to reassert 
their partnership paradigm based on the laws of the new 
regime. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Agents 
The model designed for this analysis uses heterogeneous 
agents to represent stylized individuals in the Florentine 
economy in the 14th century. These agents do not represent 
actual historical figures, but rather abstracted decision 
makers operating on a paradigm that has been hypothesized 
by historians on the mindset of conservative Florentine 
businessmen. 
The two types of agents that are represented in this model 
are ‘bankers’ and ‘tradesmen’. Bankers represent the 
merchant bankers of Florence, who began as almost purely 
domestic bankers in the early 14th century and, by the 
beginning of the 15th century, had become international 
businessmen. ‘Tradesmen’, in the context of this model, are 
loosely defined as guildsmen – men who were skilled in a 
trade and, per the usual paradigm of the High Middle Ages, 
were part of a guild in the early 14th century. 
Agents are defined not only by their class, {banker, 
tradesmen}, but also by attributes. These attributes abstractly 
define an individual’s place in society, as well as their 
desirability as a partner, which will be discussed in the next 
section: 
 Capital (ci) – this attribute represents the relative 
wealth of an individual. 
 Expertise (ei) – this attribute represents the 
agent’s skill in his craft. While there were 
certainly different trades in Florence at this time, 
this model does not distinguish between guilds at 
the present time. 
 Age (ai) – a simple calculation of age, which 
increases each year. At random points, agents 
will die and be replaced with a new agent. 
B. Partnerships 
Partnerships, either business partnerships or 
apprenticeships, were formed by individuals selecting a 
different agent that was geographically close to them as well 
as held a significantly high attribute in either capital or 
expertise. Tradesmen of the medieval period would often 
form apprenticeships, with a master gaining a significant 
amount of the capital, and the apprentice gaining experience 
and expertise in the craft [source here]. These master-
apprentice relationships would often become enveloped into 
guilds, where masters of a given craft would partner together 
for negotiating power. 
Prior to the revolt, tradesmen make decision on who to 
partner with in the following calculation (assuming agent j is 
active): 
min
𝑖
[(𝑑𝑖𝑗)
2
− 0.1 × 𝑒𝑖] (1) 
Where d is the Euclidean distance between tradesmen i 
and j. This represents tradesmen making connections to the 
most experienced tradesmen in their most immediate 
vicinity. These partnerships, like the master-apprentice 
partnerships they represent, are directed and non-equal. 
Bankers make similar partnerships with other bankers, 
although the partnerships are undirected. They are formed 
along the following paradigm (assuming agent j is active): 
min
𝑖
[(𝑑𝑖𝑗)
2
− 0.1 × 𝑐𝑖] (2) 
After the revolt, the partnership paradigm of the 
tradesmen changes to that of the bankers - the paradigm 
quantified in equation (2). In addition, any new partnerships 
the tradesmen make will be with bankers, rather than fellow 
tradesmen. This aims to replicate the 1382-1393 regime and 
the oversight of the guilds by the Mercanzia. 
These partnerships also impact the attributes of those 
participating. For a tradesmen that has a partnership directed 
out of the agent (i.e. an apprentice), his expertise (ei) 
increases by one for each outgoing partnership. For both 
partners of any partnership, capital (ci) increases by one for 
each tick. 
C. Simulation Setup 
This model was coded and simulated using NetLogo 5.0, 
an agent-based toolkit that can graphically represent not only 
heterogeneous agents, but also links between these agents. 
This model defines two breeds of agents, tradesmen and 
bankers, with the attributes described in section II.A. Each 
tradesman is initialized with ci ~ U(0, 10) and ei ~ U(0, 100), 
where each banker is initialized with ci ~ U(0, 100) and ei ~ 
U(0, 10). Both types of agent are initialized with age ~ U(0, 
1000), representing any age from 0 to 83 years old. 
As the positioning of agents is important (both historically 
and in this simulation) to the creation of partnerships, the 
location of bankers and tradesmen needed to be defined. 
Tradesmen are randomly placed in the lower half of the 
model world, while bankers are randomly placed in the 
upper half of the world. The model world can be assumed to 
be a toroid, meaning that the edges continue along the 
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opposite side of the simulated world. The graphical 
representation of the bankers are blue person icons, while 
the tradesmen are red person icons. A view of the model in 
the middle of the run can be seen in Fig. 1. 
  
Fig. 1 Screen shot of simulation model 
As time progresses from month to month, age increases 
by one each simulation tick. In each tick, each agent selects 
a random value with an exponential distribution and a mean 
of 600. If this is higher than their current age, then the agent 
dies and is replaced with a new agent with attributes holding 
zero values. 
At a certain point in the model, the global Boolean 
variable “revolt”, which always begins the simulation set to 
False, may be set to True. In the model runs described in this 
paper, the simulated revolt occurs in the middle of the 
simulation run, at t = 600. This represents the Ciompi 
Revolt, as well as the succeeding regimes of the following 
one and a half decades. Partnerships are not immediately 
disbanded, but a new paradigm is enacted which promotes 
new partnerships to form across trades, formed between 
bankers and tradesmen, as observed in the following section. 
The model is populated with 10 banker agents and 30 
tradesmen agents at time 0. The simulation is then run for 
1200 ticks, where the revolt occurs at tick 600. The primary 
output of the model is the average per-capital capital across 
the entire agent population. The primary method of analysis 
of results was Monte Carlo Simulation, running the model 
for 1000 runs, with different random seeds. 
III. RESULTS 
A. Rise in Capital 
The primary output for this model, per-capita capital 
across the agent population, shows a consistent increase after 
the revolt occurs. The null hypothesis of H0: µ0 = µ1 can be 
tested in respect to the alternative hypothesis, H1: µ0 < µ1 
(one-tailed Z-test). Two averages are taken from each run - 
the average of the 600 observations (1 per tick) of per-capita 
capital prior to the revolt (revolt = FALSE), and the average 
of 600 post-revolt observations (revolt = TRUE). The 
statistics for each of these populations across the 1000 runs 
is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I. 
STATISTICS FOR PER-CAPITA CAPITAL OUTPUT, PRE-REVOLT VS. 
POST-REVOLT AVERAGES 
Statistic Pre-Revolt  
(revolt = FALSE) 
Post-Revolt 
(revolt = TRUE) 
Average  3.3648  14.3325 
Standard 
Deviation 
 0.4759  1.0231 
Number of 
Observations 
1000 1000 
 
At any reasonable level of significance, the Z-test 
produces a p-value of 0, leading to the conclusion that the 
null hypothesis can be rejected in preference to the 
alternative hypothesis, meaning that the jump in per-capita 
capital across the model is statistically significant. 
B. Network Structure 
It is important to note that not only does the network 
structure shift across the model when the revolt occurs, but 
whether the networks both before and after resemble to some 
degree the networks that occurred in Florence in the 14th and 
15th centuries. 
Prior to the revolt, the tradesmen partnerships are limited 
in scope to 2-6 participants, usually due to the death of the 
master and the apprentice breaking his tie and forming new 
ties. Partnerships across the bankers tends to be reasonably 
diffuse, a banker only forming on the order of 1-3 
partnerships at any given time. 
This pattern changes rapidly after the revolt, when the 
bankers become the major hubs of networks. Qualitatively, 
this can be seen in the structure of the networks at the end of 
the simulation run, as shown in Fig. 2. Quantitatively, the 
number of links that bankers achieve throughout their life 
increases, , as seen in Table II, which displays the averages 
across all runs of the median and maximum degree values. 
 
Fig. 2 Screen shot of simulation model at end of a simulation run 
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TABLE II. 
STATISTICS FOR LINKS PER AGENT, PRE-REVOLT VS. POST-REVOLT 
AVERAGES 
Statistic Tradesmen 
Pre-Revolt 
Tradesmen 
Post-Revolt 
Bankers 
Pre-Revolt 
Bankers 
Post-Revolt 
Median No. 
Links per run 
1.9051 1.1090 1.3340 3.9971 
Maximum 
No. Links 
per run 
4.8188 2.7604 2.5853 10.6292 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Findings 
The model was able to simulate the emergence of two 
substantially different networks structures across the 
population, punctuated by the revolt global variable. This 
was not generated through a top-down infrastructure design, 
but from agents assessing their “best” choice for a 
partnership. Although the selection and partnership process 
may not be verifiable –as certainly every banker, guildsman 
and contract were different – the model was able to establish 
some abstract, stylized guidelines that produced a new 
model environment. 
The second interesting finding was that the per-capita 
capital, or the capital across the individuals, was 
dramatically increased, due to these new partnerships 
forming. Although such mental constructs as “profit 
margins” and “utility maximization” are not generally 
appropriate in the medieval or renaissance mind [3], the 
access to capital was of importance to tradesmen and 
bankers both. The new partnership system dispersed across 
the Western World as a mechanism for generating capital. 
B. Implications 
The new partnership system not only increased the wealth 
and influence of those partners involved, but also led to 
emergence of Florence as a cultural hub. This system did not 
emerge from a completely new creation, but the reuse of one 
legal mercantile construct by new actors. Bankers became 
the new oligarchs of the Florentine republic, culminating in 
the dominance of the Medici in 1434, largely due to their 
power derived from the partnership system.  
In a more subtle extension of this new partnership system, 
these new republican oligarchs had ties to numerous 
industries, as well as the business and political acumen to 
survive in both worlds. These new elites were the beginning 
of what today we would term “Renaissance men”, being the 
archetype of the values made possible by the partnership 
system, as addressed by Padgett [2]. 
C. Further Research 
To say that this is a highly simplistic, stylized, and 
abstract model is accurate. There were certainly multiple 
dynamics going on during this turbulent time in Florentine 
history that led to the exact nature of the partnership system 
as we know it. While this model has already shown the most 
basic conclusion – the emergence of a partnership system 
from the actions of agents – more elements can certainly be 
added to the model to garner many more results and 
descriptions about this simulated Florentine Republic. 
More importantly, while the qualitative structure of the 
partnership networks were informally validated, more 
thorough, formal validation techniques will be necessary to 
quantitatively validate this model and the results.  This can 
be done by comparing the statistics of networks (density, 
centrality distributions, etc.) of the simulated networks to 
that of the historical networks. These data have not been 
available until recently; new work in this field over the past 
decade has allowed for analysis, and comparison, of 
historical networks to be analyzed quantitatively. 
Finally, agent-based modeling has offered interesting and 
complex views into the past, illuminating on patterns of 
culture and society that may not otherwise be discernible 
through lack of archaeological evidence [4]. It is possible 
that this model, and others like it, incorporating agent-based 
models with social network analysis, may shed light on the 
emergence of social invention at various points in human 
history. 
V. SUMMARY 
The goal of this paper was to present a simulation model 
aimed at replicating the emergence of the partnership system 
in early Renaissance Florence. Ultimately, the structure of 
the network produced both prior to and after the simulated 
revolt within the model showed similarities to the networks 
documented in the late 14th and early 15th centuries in 
Florence. Furthermore, the rise in capital that in part derived 
from this new network structure was an emergent property 
of the model, one that may explain the success that the 
partnership system garnered in reproducing across Western 
Europe. Through this highly abstract, simplified model of 
network construction between stylized agents, it may be 
possible to answer further questions on the nature of the 
emergence of capitalism and mercantilism in renaissance 
Florence. 
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